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Abstract
The abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 
and the national government reform agenda of the mid-2000s brought about 
‘mainstreaming’ of Indigenous programs and opened them up to new public 
management (NPM) principles. This paper discusses this change, particularly 
in relation to the implementation in the Kimberley region of Western Australia 
of mainstreamed agreements on remote Indigenous housing between the 
Australian Government and State and Territory governments. These have 
been designed to provide new housing and renovate existing housing in 
seriously overcrowded remote Aboriginal communities. These agreements 
shifted Australian Government funding and responsibility for housing from 
Indigenous community-controlled organisations to State governments. This 
paper explores the ‘normalisation’ or ‘mainstreaming’ of housing policy in 
this NPM environment, through a case study of the impact of this policy 
on one organisation, Marra Worra Worra (MWW), and its remote Kimberley 
communities.
Under these housing programs, MWW is one of six contractors engaged 
across the state by Western Australia’s Housing Authority to manage 
housing in remote Aboriginal communities. Until recently it managed all 
aspects of housing including the maintenance of 474 community houses; 
from 2016 the contract for repairs and maintenance was given to a 
State-wide non-Indigenous contractor while MWW retains other property 
management services. In managing these programs, MWW is at the 
interface of tensions between Aboriginal cultural realities and the demands of 
an increasingly ‘normalised’ housing policy.
Keywords: Indigenous community organisations, Indigenous housing, 
Kimberley Aboriginal organisations, new public management, public value
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Introduction
I n the remote Kimberley region of Western Australia (WA), during the Australian Government policy era 
of ‘self-determination’ which began in the early 1970s, 
Kimberley Aboriginal people established a number of 
significant Aboriginal organisations to represent their 
interests and provide services to their people. Marra 
Worra Worra (MWW) in Fitzroy Crossing is the oldest 
such organisation which provides housing, employment 
and other services to Aboriginal people in the Fitzroy 
Valley, West Kimberley. This paper explores how 
changes in Australian Government policies, especially 
Indigenous policy and housing policy, are affecting 
its operation and the housing service provided to its 
constituent communities. It will explore the social impact 
of ‘normalising’ (Sullivan 2011) or ‘mainstreaming’ 
housing policy in this new public management (NPM) 
environment, through a case study of the impact of this 
policy on MWW and its remote Kimberley communities. 
The paper is structured in the following way. First 
I describe the setting briefly; then I outline some 
background about the changes in Indigenous policy in 
the last 15 years, particularly in relation to housing, and 
explain how the policy of ‘mainstreaming’ has brought 
NPM approaches into the Indigenous housing policy 
space. I then discuss how this has affected Aboriginal 
communities and organisations in the Fitzroy Valley, 
and particularly their current housing provider, MWW. In 
doing this I contrast a NPM approach with a relational 
Public Value Management approach (O’Flynn 2007) to 
Indigenous housing.
The setting: the Fitzroy Valley, 
Kimberley region, Western Australia
The Kimberley region of Australia is a vast area in the 
north-west of the country, east from Broome, in WA. 
Generally considered ‘remote’, its dramatically beautiful 
tropical savannah landscape was colonised by European 
pastoralists in the late 1800s. This colonial expansion 
evoked violent confrontations over land and natural 
resources as Aboriginal people struggled to retain their 
livelihoods and ways of life in the face of the pastoral 
incursion. Eventually, pastoralists and Aboriginal people 
settled into a form of co-existence, as Aboriginal people 
were engaged as labour in the pastoral industry, and 
thereby continued to live on their traditional ‘country’ at 
least until the late 1960s; some were living on missions 
run by religious groups. However, the Pastoral Award 
1969 brought an end to this situation, as pastoralists 
were required to pay award wages to their Aboriginal 
workers, rather than just rations. Soon after this, many 
Kimberley Aboriginal people were forced off the pastoral 
stations and, like refugees, gathered at regional centres 
like Fitzroy Crossing (Thorburn 2011). In the Fitzroy 
Valley this event ‘saw more than a thousand Aboriginal 
people displaced from surrounding cattle stations, their 
ancestral grounds, and forced to live in atrocious living 
circumstances on the fringes of Fitzroy Crossing’ (Marra 
Worra Worra Aboriginal Corporation (MWW) 2016:8). 
As a result of Aboriginal activism, many people now 
live back on country on ‘Land Trust reserves excised 
from non-Aboriginal pastoral leases; and station and 
outstation settlements on Aboriginal-owned pastoral 
leases’ (Morphy 2010:16). Others remain living in 
discrete ‘communities’ in and close to Fitzroy Crossing. 
Approximately 2,700–3,000 people live in the Fitzroy 
Valley, most in Fitzroy Crossing but others in some 
43 communities varying in size from over 270 to less 
than 10 residents (Morphy 2010). The town of Fitzroy 
Crossing is situated on the massive Fitzroy River on the 
land of Bunuba people. It has become the urban service 
centre for five language groups from the surrounding 
Fitzroy Valley: the Bunuba, Gooniyandi, Wangkatjungka, 
Walmajarri and Nyikina peoples. Thus the Fitzroy Valley, 
as Morphy explains, ‘…is a cattle station landscape 
imposed on an underlying Aboriginal cultural and 
linguistic landscape’ (Morphy 2010:14).
Australian Indigenous policy background
Soon after the forced relocation of Fitzroy Valley 
Aboriginal people into Fitzroy Crossing, Australian 
Government policy shifted from an essentially 
assimilationist policy approach to one of self-
determination. This was in response to strong Aboriginal 
calls for such an approach throughout Australia. It is in 
this policy era that MWW was formed in the late 1970s.1 
While many would argue that this policy was merely self-
management rather than genuine self-determination, it 
nevertheless enabled and supported the development 
of a diverse and vibrant indigenous sector (Rowse 2005) 
which advanced Indigenous rights in diverse areas from 
legal, health, housing, and community development. 
Self-determination was also later expressed through 
the creation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC), a national body elected by 
Indigenous people, with some 35 elected regional 
councils across the nation. It had both advocacy and 
service delivery functions, and Aboriginal housing was 
among those. The housing program for remote areas, 
known as the Community Housing and Infrastructure 
Program (CHIP), was a community sector program 
providing community-controlled housing at low rents 
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for Indigenous people through their own organisations. 
ATSIC also managed the Community Development 
Employment Projects (CDEP), an alternative community 
employment program for Aboriginal people, using the 
equivalent of ‘mainstream’ income support payments 
to support part-time employment in community 
development initiatives. 
However, by the mid-2000s, the Howard Government 
portrayed the national Indigenous policy era of ‘self-
determination’ as having failed. Australian Government 
policy shifted to a ‘mainstreaming’ or ‘normalising’ 
approach. ATSIC was abolished and its programs moved 
to relevant ‘mainstream’ government departments. 
‘Normalising’ had many connotations; its recent use 
was associated with the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response and policies such as income management 
(Altman 2007, Lovell 2016) but ideas of ‘normalisation’ go 
back much further in settler-colonial discourse, entailing 
settler superiority and framing settler lifeways as the 
‘norm’, with the erasure of Aboriginal difference (Howard-
Wagner & Kelly 2011). In the current context, normalising 
and mainstreaming also involved the development of a 
range of sectoral partnership agreements between the 
Australian Government and the States and Territories, of 
which remote Aboriginal housing was one (Habibis 2013, 
Sullivan 2011). Thus remote Aboriginal housing policy now 
sits within a broader Council of Australian Governments2 
(COAG) policy. This policy framework aims to ‘Close the 
Gap’ in Indigenous health, education and employment 
between Indigenous and other Australians (COAG 2007). 
Behind this shift was a view that Aboriginal people and 
their organisations were deficient, and an individualistic 
rather than community-based paradigm was now to 
underpin Indigenous policy. Individuals were to be shifted 
off ‘passive welfare’ and incorporated into the Australian 
economy (Howard-Wagner 2007). As Habibis notes, 
such an individualistic approach to tenancy management 
‘represents an experiment in culture change that has 
profound implications for Indigenous tenants’ (Habibis 
2013:771).
This mainstreaming policy meant that most Australian 
Government services to Indigenous people, previously 
provided through Aboriginal organisations, were no 
longer to be provided through them. When ATSIC 
was abolished, CHIP was initially maintained and 
transferred to the Australian Government Department 
of Families and Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs. But a negative review of CHIP in 2007 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007) led to its abolition in 
favour of a program to be implemented through States. 
This was intended to achieve standards of remote 
Aboriginal housing management equivalent to those of 
State housing agencies (Habibis et al. 2016). As Sullivan 
(2016) explains, once ATSIC was abolished, in 2006 
‘Western Australia signed a bilateral agreement with the 
Australian Government on Indigenous Affairs. According 
to a state government discussion paper, the agreement 
sought to regularise housing, infrastructure and essential 
and municipal services’ (Sullivan 2016:5) to something 
equivalent to services provided in urban WA. In doing 
so, it overturned many decades of policy whereby the 
Australian Government funded ‘Aboriginal housing, local 
roads, water and electricity supplies, sanitation and 
community administration’ (Sullivan 2016:1). This shift in 
responsibility was enforced by the new agreement that 
made the WA State Government accountable for meeting 
these standards of housing and other essential services. 
With these changes in responsibility well underway, 
in late 2008 the new Labor Australian Government 
announced a 10-year National Partnership Agreement 
on Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH); it was one of 
a series of national partnership agreements between the 
Australian and the State governments that flowed from 
an overarching National Indigenous Reform Agreement 
(COAG 2008) between the Australian Government and 
the States and Territories. This was part of wider reform 
of Commonwealth/State funding arrangements under 
the Federal Financial Relations Act 2009 (Sullivan 2011). 
This agreement effectively more fully implemented the 
new mainstreaming approach to Indigenous policy. It was 
followed in mid-2016 by a rather similar program for two 
years to end June 2018, called the National Partnership 
Agreement on Remote Housing (NPRH).
As part of the wider shift in Commonwealth-State 
relations and mainstreaming of Indigenous policy, 
longstanding Australian Government funding for 
municipal services in remote Aboriginal communities 
ended in late 2014 (Emerson 2014). The WA Government’s 
subsequent response was to threaten closure of remote 
communities it considered too costly to service (Kagi 
2014). After significant Aboriginal protests, in July 2016 
the WA Government articulated its approach to providing 
services to the many remote Indigenous communities it 
was now responsible for, indicating clearly that its focus 
would be on the larger communities where education and 
employment opportunities were available (Government 
of Western Australia 2016). A change of government in 
WA in early 2017 has led to its Regional Reform Unit 
undertaking more research on service provision and 
outcomes across the Kimberley and other remote regions 
(Seivwright et al. 2017).
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New public management in 
the Australian context
An important feature of the shift to ‘mainstreaming’ 
Indigenous policy was that it brought NPM ideas, by 
then becoming increasingly embedded in the Australian 
public sector, much more centrally into Indigenous 
policy. ATSIC had to a large degree shielded the sector 
from this until the mid-2000s. NPM began in Australia in 
the 1980s in what O’Flynn refers to as a ‘bureaucratic’ 
phase intended to improve corporate management; in 
the 1990s it shifted to what she calls a ‘marketisation’ 
phase, and it is this phase that was in full swing when 
Indigenous programs were ‘mainstreamed’. This 
marketisation phase, ‘rested on the creation of markets 
in the public sector and the use of contracts to define 
and govern relationships’ (O’Flynn 2007: 355). It was 
heavily influenced by public choice theory, which sees 
governments as inevitably inefficient, and principal-agent 
theory, in which the principal (in this case government) 
has to create incentive conditions under which an agent 
(the contracted service provider) will meet the principal’s 
goals. Thus NPM brought ideas of competition and 
efficiency into the Indigenous policy space. Central to 
this was the notion of setting targets and contracting 
service providers to undertake projects or programmes to 
achieve them as ‘efficiently and effectively’ as possible. In 
addition to bringing the market into public administration, 
NPM separated the policy and delivery roles, and policy 
makers engaged the delivery of services through new 
technologies like performance based contracts (O’Flynn 
2007).
In Australia, the service providers favoured by such 
government tendering and contracting processes have 
often been large non-Indigenous private sector and not-
for-profit organisations, in direct competition with the 
Indigenous community-controlled sector. Furthermore, 
in order to retain their roles and services, Aboriginal 
community organisations have had to conform to 
mainstream systems of management and accountability 
which take no account of their cultural contexts or their 
histories and origins as Aboriginal self-determination 
initiatives. Such systems ultimately enable government to 
regulate them (Colyer 2014, Sullivan 2009, 2015).
The National Partnership Agreement on 
Remote Indigenous Housing (NPARIH)
The implementation of NPARIH, was designed to provide 
new housing and renovate existing housing in seriously 
overcrowded remote Aboriginal communities (NPARIH 
Review 2008–13). It shifted Australian Government 
funding and responsibility for housing and municipal and 
essential services away from Indigenous community-
controlled organisations to State governments. But 
the NPARIH agreement came with strings attached. It 
required tenancy management and land tenure reforms, 
which in Western Australia were enacted through 
Aboriginal Housing Management Agreements (HMAs) 
negotiated between the WA Housing Authority and 
Aboriginal communities. In WA, most remote Aboriginal 
community housing is on Aboriginal Land Trust (ALT) 
land, so unlike in the Northern Territory, the State 
government did not need to take leases over Aboriginal 
land in order to provide housing (Habibis et al. 2016). 
However, the HMAs bring the Residential Tenancies 
Act of WA into full effect which requires ‘regularised 
tenancy agreements’ including ‘paying rent at public 
housing settings, maintaining their homes to public 
housing standards and meeting obligations for good 
behaviour’ (Habibis forthcoming). Thus the Australian 
Government was removing itself from management of 
remote Indigenous housing, but was setting terms for 
State policies that aligned with its broader approach 
to Indigenous affairs. That is, it was trying to force 
people away from small remote outstations into larger 
centres where services and housing were provided and 
essentially to ‘normalise’ Aboriginal people’s behaviour. 
But as Habibis points out, States did little to adapt 
mainstream expectations and approaches to the social 
and cultural realities of remote Aboriginal communities. In 
particular she notes some obvious differences between 
mainstream urban housing and these remote situations 
in which public housing authorities now had to operate. 
Among them: the absence of a housing market in remote 
communities; implications of collective land tenure and 
native title; very limited service infrastructure; the high 
costs of goods and services; the long travel distances 
on unsealed roads, with consequent stresses on staff; 
and the major challenges for repairs and maintenance of 
all these. Furthermore, the large multi-family households 
often found in remote communities create higher repair 
and maintenance costs and the mobility of people makes 
rent collection difficult; then there are low education 
levels, language and cultural differences and tenants with 
disability and other needs (Habibis forthcoming). Western 
Australia was unique in working through Indigenous 
community sector organisations and thus developing a 
hybrid model which went some way to recognising these 
differences. Under the NPARIH program some 56% 
of remote Aboriginal Housing in WA was managed by 
Indigenous and other community organisations (Habibis 
et al. 2016:423); the rest is directly managed by the WA 
Housing Authority. Other jurisdictions also adapted the 
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mainstream model to greater or lesser degrees, using 
local government or other providers in some locations 
(Habibis et al. 20164).
New housing provided by NPARIH (and more recently 
NPRH) is very welcome in the Kimberley, but the 
process of providing it in the Fitzroy Valley through 
non-Indigenous contractors did not maximise use of 
local Aboriginal labour. In some cases quality and siting 
issues mean sustainability of the housing is poor.5 Thus 
maintenance costs will be high and housing will be 
less sustainable. Local Aboriginal people feel that this 
occurred because local knowledge and capacity is being 
overlooked. 
Marra Worra Worra: housing 
service in the Kimberley
Marra Worra Worra (MWW) is one of five community 
organisations contracted by WA’s Department of 
Housing to manage Aboriginal housing in six remote 
regions.6 MWW’s longstanding goal is to contribute to 
a sustainable future for the people of the Fitzroy Valley, 
and to ‘create opportunities and culturally appropriate 
solutions that enables the Fitzroy Valley to be socially 
and economically independent’ (MWW 2016: 12). Its 
present role reflects both continuity and change in its 
relationships with the various language groups of the 
Fitzroy Valley. MWW was formed in the period following 
the forced relocation of Aboriginal families off pastoral 
properties into Fitzroy Crossing. As they tried to return 
to their lands, and establish their futures as distinct 
‘communities’ or outstations, increasingly these kinship 
groups needed to incorporate to receive government 
funds. As Thorburn records, ‘Eventually as more and 
more communities began to incorporate, the number 
reached a critical mass where it became sensible to 
have a central body to manage some of the requirements 
of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (ACA 
Act)’7 (Thorburn 2011:91). Thus MWW was established 
to support these newly-formed community councils and 
enable them to meet their paperwork obligations under 
the ACA Act. As Thorburn explains, ‘it thus allowed 
people to be based on outstations and to receive welfare 
entitlements, by providing a service of cashing social 
security cheques, as well as organising community 
chuck-in systems’ (Thorburn 2011:91) that enabled 
individuals to make contributions for community power 
and other shared costs. Its focus was on non-Bunuba 
people trying to re-establish themselves on their country 
throughout the Valley. Thus, MWW’s role by the early 
1980s was to provide ‘an overarching accounting service’ 
supporting local council book-keepers, and managing 
all the financial requirements of Australian and State 
government funding, whether through social security 
payments or other sources. Of course resource agencies 
like MWW did far more than this, helping Indigenous 
people negotiate their way through bureaucratic 
processes and supporting their cultural and political 
aspirations (Sullivan 1996).
The Bunuba people meanwhile remained on the United 
Aborigines Mission (UAM) reserve in Fitzroy Crossing. 
This was eventually leased to the Junjuwa Community 
Inc in 1978 (Thorburn 2011:93). Through the 1980s and 
early 1990s, Junjuwa Community Inc and the Bunuba 
Aboriginal Corporation each operated their own CDEP for 
Bunuba people. But after 1994, they came together under 
the Junjuwa Community. The CDEP Program at that time 
gave communities a great deal of autonomy to pursue 
their own priorities. MWW also had its own CDEP, but in 
July 2004 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services 
(ATSIS – which managed the ATSIC programs following 
ATSIC reform in 2003–04) determined that ‘MWW was 
to become the major CDEP organisation for the Fitzroy 
Valley’ (Thorburn 2011:100). Junjuwa’s CDEP participants, 
and many others, were now to be under the control of 
MWW. 
This meant that community councils that used to 
manage both housing and CDEP in the ATSIC period 
(1990s–2004/5) no longer did so, and MWW has 
(sometimes reluctantly) taken over control of these 
programs. Housing has been ‘mainstreamed’ (see above) 
and over a number of years and iterations CDEP has 
been significantly reformulated away from a community 
development program to become a jobs and welfare 
compliance program, now known as the Community 
Development Program (CDP) (Fowkes & Sanders 2015, 
2016, Jordan et al. 2016) . The overall effect has been 
a centralising of control over housing and employment 
at MWW and increasingly tightly prescribed programs 
with little room for flexibility and synergy with each 
other compared to earlier years. Attempts to use CDP 
to develop small enterprises are now considerably more 
difficult due to the design of the program (Jordan et al. 
2016).
In effect, MWW, an organisation originally established to 
help people move back on to country in the 1970s and 
1980s, and assist their local organisations with finances, 
paperwork, and general support has now taken over 
most of their original functions, leaving them greatly 
diminished. MWW has grown substantially as a result. 
This has come about as Aboriginal people of the Fitzroy 
Valley struggled in the new mainstreaming policy context 
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to keep control of the programs in Aboriginal hands. 
At this time, many Fitzroy Valley Aboriginal people see 
MWW’s role as strategically important to their ability 
to do this, as it has the capacity to manage these new 
programs in ways that satisfy current government 
funding contractual requirements. As one Community 
Council Chair said, ‘They crippled us and we were lucky 
we had MWW as one organisation that could speak for 
us rather than individual communities speaking’.8 By 
‘crippling’ he was referring to the removal of housing and 
employment programs from community councils; but he 
acknowledged the strength of regional Aboriginal people 
together through MWW to at least keep the housing and 
employment programs in the Fitzroy Valley, as well as the 
advocacy capacity a larger organisation like MWW has 
with governments. MWW has, over the years, adopted 
a strong advocacy role as well as fulfilling its service 
delivery role. The result of all this is that the Aboriginal 
governance landscape of the Fitzroy Valley has been 
reshaped by the changing terms of government funding.
The contracted housing program 
The MWW contract with the WA Housing Authority9 is 
to provide property and tenancy management services 
to 476 properties in 27 communities in Fitzroy Crossing 
township and the Fitzroy Valley10. The contract typifies the 
performance contracting O’Flynn identifies as indicative 
of Australia’s NPM approach. That is, contracts set out 
the the ‘requirements, monitoring, reward and incentive 
systems’ (O’Flynn 2007:356) which define the relationship 
between the principal (the WA Housing Authority) and 
the agent (MWW). As she says, competitive tendering 
has become common and ‘Competition between bidders 
is intended to spur efficiency gains and cost saving for 
purchasers’ (O’Flynn 2007:357). In this case, the contract 
between the WA Housing Authority and MWW has eight 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The first three relate 
to policies, procedures to follow, the use of the records 
management system and what housing inspection 
compliance entails. The next four relate to biannual 
housing inspections (every 182 days); occupation 
times of available vacated properties (21 days or less); 
rent collection occurring; and for accounts in debt, 
compliance with negotiated repayment arrangements. 
The final KPI relates to Aboriginal employment being at 
least 15%. All except the employment data has to be 
recorded and reported in a Housing Management System 
known as Habitat. One consequence of the use of this 
information technology (IT) system is that MWW has had 
considerable staff turnover as some of the previous staff, 
who were using a paper-based compliance system very 
successfully, did not have the IT skills or confidence to 
manage the Habitat System. MWW now has to attract 
staff with a higher level of IT competence than was 
necessary before. On-the-job training is provided for 
those willing to learn and 87.5% of the 32 staff in the 
Housing Section of MWW are Indigenous, most of whom 
are from the Fitzroy Valley. 
To meet the KPIs, the housing department below the 
management level has been re-organised into three 
teams each of which aligns with the three key housing 
KPIs: the Inspection Team carries out the inspections of 
all houses; the Maintenance Team deals with vacated 
houses and arranges incoming tenants; and the Rental 
Administration Team manages rental applications, rent 
assessments, and rent-related enquiries. A fourth team 
provides a Tenancy Support Service which is funded by 
the WA Government independently. These staff teams 
go out very frequently to communities to carry out their 
tasks, and while they are extremely respectful in the way 
they work with community members, they are expected 
to, and largely do, meet the KPIs set for them.
MWW compliance with the bi-annual property inspection 
regime is now high. Although it struggled to achieve this 
initially, it has maintained 100% completion of regular 
inspections since April 2016. Even in the wet season 
when some properties can’t be accessed, the lowest level 
of compliance with the inspection schedule has been 
93%. This is quite a remarkable level of achievement 
and depends on excellent monitoring of the property 
inspection schedule and persistence and determination 
to catch people at home and conduct the inspections. 
Extensive local knowledge of the communities and 
contacts that help staff know where people are 
undoubtedly assists. Completing one inspection may 
require several return visits to remote communities.
The work of the Maintenance Team is sometimes 
complicated. Once a house is vacated and MWW is 
informed by the tenant, MWW inspects the property and 
provides maintenance requirements to the WA Housing 
Authority. The Housing Authority in turn sends out a Work 
Order to its State-wide contractor for the house to be 
prepared for new tenants. Once the house is ready, MWW 
has 21 days to find a new tenant and get them into the 
house. However, sometimes tenants leave houses without 
informing MWW or MWW is not advised by the Housing 
Authority or the Head Contractor that vacated houses 
are ready for new tenants. To avoid these situations, 
MWW asks Community Councils to let them know if they 
become aware of a house becoming vacant. Or MWW 
staff may find out when vacated houses are ready for 
new tenants through their own channels. They then check 
formally and start organising for tenants to move in. 
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Thus, MWW has its own local systems that overcome 
problems in the formal process in the Kimberley context. 
Its connections to its communities, and the local and 
cultural knowledge its staff bring to their roles, smooths 
out what might otherwise be dysfunctional arrangements. 
Similarly MWW uses its own relationships with families 
and Community Councils in situations where a family 
is found ‘squatting’ in a vacant house, or a tenant or 
family member dies in a house. Cultural knowledge 
and sensitive approaches to relationships are critically 
important in managing such situations. The value MWW 
brings to these situations is invisible to the contract 
managers in the WA Government, yet essential to the 
effective implementation of the contract in the Kimberley. 
With contract reporting focusing on pre-specified tasks 
completed, this local systems knowledge MWW brings to 
bear on the achievement of those tasks finds no place in 
the reporting regime, and it is this absence that maintains 
this invisbility in the system.
MWW staff in the Rental Administration Team assist 
individuals with paperwork, such as rental applications, 
and meeting requirements for rent assessment. Rents 
are currently 25% of each tenants’ gross income. A head 
tenant is responsible for each house, but each individual 
resident is charged rent. For people in employment 
this involves MWW staff obtaining their pay slips and 
calculating their average pay over a three month period, 
as much casual work has varying weekly income. 
As tenants move in and out of homes, regular rental 
assessment is required. This is a complex and costly 
system for the service delivery agency as Aboriginal 
people are often quite mobile, especially seasonally, 
and keeping track of tenancy payments is not easy. For 
people who are highly indebted, MWW asks no more than 
an additional $5 per week to be taken out of their account 
towards the debt repayment. They feel a strong obligation 
not to impoverish their own people. MWW would prefer a 
much simpler system of rent assessment and collection. 
They are considering support for a ‘per house’ rental 
amount and a Centrepay system of compulsory rental 
collection from tenants (an Australian Government 
housing review team suggestion). If appropriately 
structured, this could provide a sustainable level of 
income for ongoing repairs and maintenance. 
Helping Aboriginal people understand their rights and 
responsibilities as tenants in community housing under 
the new arrangements is not always easy. One MWW 
team is dedicated specifically to providing special 
support to tenants who need it (e.g. aged, disabled) 
under the Supported Tenancy Education Program 
(STEP)11. This team is contracted to provide casework 
support to individual tenants and households referred 
to them by the Housing management team. MWW staff 
help tenants manage issues that are causing problems, 
conflict or stress in their homes, e.g. when visitors stay 
too long, or there are too many of them, and they make 
no contribution to the household costs.
The resolution of these sorts of issues is where cultural 
knowledge and getting the culturally right people to 
give guidance to visitors can be very valuable, if not 
essential, to their resolution. Other problems may relate 
to issues such as too many dogs, and associated health 
problems. Here MWW can work in a culturally sensitive 
way with other service providers and deal with difficult 
issues in a coordinated way. MWW staff have the strong 
relationship with a tenant and with other service providers 
that enables them to do this. For MWW the goal is to 
help tenants stay where they want to, and to provide the 
necessary support and guidance to enable them to do 
so, rather than to apply mainstream housing rules in a 
rigid way. 
A major national study undertaken of NPARIH tenancy 
management services (Habibis et al. 2015) argued that 
hybrid social housing models such as that employed 
by the WA Housing Authority with Indigenous service 
organisations like MWW are the most successful in 
delivery of tenancy management services that are 
knowledgeable, culturally competent, flexible and 
adaptable. MWW’s work certainly demonstrates how 
an Indigenous organisation’s cultural knowledge and 
extensive community relationships enables this housing 
system to work. In fact it is hard to imagine how it could 
be done by a non-Indigenous contractor from outside the 
Fitzroy Valley without the local and cultural knowledge 
and connections.12 Furthermore, any ‘surplus’13 MWW 
derives from efficient management of the contract 
currently flows back into the community in the form of 
grants to various organisations, support for community 
events, or long term investments for the future needs of 
the community, rather than flowing out of the community.
Implications of State-wide contracting of 
the Repairs and Maintenance Contract
Since Habibis et al.’s 2015 study was undertaken, the 
contract previously held by MWW for housing repairs and 
maintenance was awarded to a Sydney and Fremantle-
based private contractor, as a WA State-wide contract. 
Before that, MWW had its own company and used other 
local Aboriginal contractors wherever possible. Under 
the new system, MWW receives reports of maintenance 
required on the properties it manages and logs them on 
Habitat (the IT system mentioned above); then the WA 
Housing Authority raises work orders for its State-wide 
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contractor to undertake the work. The contractor in 
turn will raise work orders with local or Broome-based 
contractors (Broome is four hours’ drive away from 
Fitzroy Crossing). The cost of such call outs, compared 
to having entirely local or even community-based people 
trained and able to manage many routine jobs, is hard to 
imagine. 
Repairs and maintenance jobs for WA Housing Authority-
managed properties are given an urgency rating: all the 
urgent jobs are classed as P2 (within 24 hours)14; P3 (48 
hours or up to 10 days); or P4 (within 28 days). These 
urgency ratings are determined by the WA Housing 
Authority and generally relate to the level of risks and 
dangers to tenants. However, they do not take account 
of the particular circumstances of the remote Kimberley 
region. For example, despite the high temperatures in 
the Kimberley (regularly exceeding 35 degrees Celsius 
with over 70% humidity), things like ‘broken ceiling fan’ 
are categorised by the Housing Authority as P4, taking 
no account of the heat and humidity in this part of WA, 
and the age and frailty of some tenants. Under previous 
contractual arrangements, MWW was able to determine 
the urgency of repairs itself and get local contractors out 
quickly where jobs were urgent.
Once MWW has logged the required repairs and 
maintenance jobs on Habitat, their contractual 
responsibilities officially end. MWW’s contract does 
not cover any monitoring or follow up of repairs or 
maintenance to ensure it is done satisfactorily (known 
as a ‘post work order’ inspection); nor is MWW informed 
when repairs they have logged have been completed. 
However, they are following up to check that jobs have 
been completed in the required timeframe15. This is 
to meet the responsibilities they feel towards their 
communities. In many cases the ‘planned maintenance 
(P4)’ in particular has not been done. None of this work is 
covered by the contract MWW has with the WA Housing 
Authority but MWW feels an obligation to community 
members to make sure repairs and maintenance they 
report is done. In this they act as advocates for the 
community members. When MWW controlled the repairs 
and maintenance contract they would be able to directly 
contract for the job and know which contractor was 
supposed to do which task and when. They no longer 
know this and so have no way of holding contractors to 
account for the quality of the work they do.16 
Another consequence of losing the repairs and 
maintenance contract is that the only Aboriginal-owned 
plumbing business, which used to do a lot of work for 
MWW, initially reduced from eight Aboriginal staff to 
just the owner, and in August 2017 closed down. He 
found contracting with the new State-wide contractor 
was unviable for his business.17 This has caused the 
business owner a great deal of stress, as he had invested 
in equipment and materials and carried a business debt 
which he has had difficulty servicing. This plumber was 
also keen to build local capacity for simple plumbing 
tasks among people at some of the more distant 
communities from Fitzroy Crossing, but he now has no 
way to do this. 
Similarly MWW had established an independent 
(subsidiary) business: ‘Fitzroy Contracting and Hire’ in 
2012. This company had been operating profitably for 
four years, employing between five and seven Aboriginal 
people to do basic maintenance (mainly carpentry work) 
for MWW. It had carried out between 1,100 and 1,200 
jobs per year for four years. Like the plumber, they tried to 
negotiate with the State-wide contractor, but its contract 
conditions were unviable in Kimberley conditions. The 
result is that the State-wide contractor uses some 
local non-Indigenous contractors, but the service to 
communities has deteriorated significantly.
Reporting of repairs and maintenance problems is 
also dependent on MWW staff being seen regularly in 
the communities. People raise issues with them when 
they see them. If tenants do not have phones, or have 
no credit in their phones, or no phone service area, 
they have no way of reporting. Thus a system which 
depends on tenants initiating reports of repairs and 
maintenance by phone does not work in all cases, and 
many maintenance issues could cause significant risks 
for tenants if MWW staff were not frequently visible in the 
communities. 
The challenges of this housing system
From the above it is clear that the operation of a 
NPM regime in Indigenous housing has led to results 
which are not creating the maximum benefits for 
Fitzroy Valley Aboriginal communities, or enabling 
Aboriginal organisations to deliver services that meet 
the broader goals of their clients. Indeed this approach 
has undermined a number of Aboriginal-controlled 
enterprises previously employing (and training) local 
Aboriginal repairs and maintenance staff. Thus the 
overall value created by this contract has reduced for 
the Aboriginal citizens of the Fitzroy Valley, even though 
MWW has performed successfully against the contract 
requirements and the perceived ‘efficiencies’ of the 
approach may be valued by the WA Government.
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From a public value perspective, public managers have 
to pursue outcomes that their clients value, often in 
complex environments such as the remote Kimberley 
region. This requires public sector managers to have 
different sorts of relationships with the organisations 
that deliver services; a shift away from the characteristic 
NPM model of a principal-agent relationship and a tightly 
prescribed contract with narrowly defined deliverables, 
to a relationship which involves negotiating how partners 
delivering services will achieve outcomes that clients 
value. As Scott makes clear, public value ‘directs us 
to use scarce resources for maximum public benefit’ 
(Scott 2013:1) and to deal with complexity (O’Flynn 
2007). Rather than just pursuing an externally defined – 
though essential – housing program, it is clear that MWW 
sees ways to achieve housing and other employment 
and business development outcomes simultaneously, 
but the contract arrangements, particularly relating to 
repairs and maintenance, fail to facilitate that. While in 
South Australia there is a shift in government rhetoric 
towards public value theory (Moore 2013), implying that 
services will be judged in terms of the value of the overall 
outcomes delivered to the public they are intended for 
(Government of South Australia n.d.), no such shift is 
occurring in WA where the government is holding firmly to 
the ‘efficiencies’ of the NPM approach.
The evidence above suggests that the way that remote 
Aboriginal housing policy is implemented in this NPM 
framework is to some degree undermining the broad 
targets of COAG and certainly is not supporting the 
goals of the Aboriginal citizens of the Fitzroy Valley. This 
is particularly so when housing policy is considered 
together with policy changes to the provision of municipal 
services and employment services which strongly favour 
Aboriginal people living in larger settlements. Since the 
1970s the Fitzroy Valley’s Aboriginal people have made 
very clear that their priorities are to remain on country 
and to live in small settlements which are quiet, and that 
enable them to maintain connection to country and to 
pass on cultural knowledge to future generations. 
Clearly, the provision of new housing only in larger 
centres that are willing to sign a HMA does not align with 
the strong preferences of Kimberley people to live on 
country in small settlements. As Sullivan points out ‘it is 
first necessary to deliver valued outcomes before we can 
say that public value has been created’ (Sullivan 2015:19). 
There is such a mismatch in the outcomes sought by 
governments and those sought by Kimberley people in 
this regard, that achievement of government-determined 
outcomes, however effectively, is unlikely to deliver public 
value as viewed by that Aboriginal public. On the other 
hand, both are wanting to develop a sustainable future 
for the Fitzroy Valley, but the current way of organising 
contracts is undermining the achievement of that 
shared goal. 
Furthermore, looking over a longer time frame, 
MWW’s role and relationships with the dispersed 
Community Councils of the Fitzroy Valley has been 
changed considerably. The relationship management 
issues that flow from this shift may be significant.18 
Aboriginal governance is dispersed and localised with 
a strong preference for a high degree of subsidiarity, 
but the NPM requirements have centralised decision-
making. Additionally, MWW’s initial role to empower 
and strengthen community organisations has shifted 
to a role of contracted service deliverer to Indigenous 
individuals. Yet these societies are not individualist 
but highly kin-based. As Habibis makes clear, ‘From 
a neo-liberal perspective, self-determination is 
problematic because its emphasis on collective rights 
and recognition of cultural difference is antithetical to 
neo-liberalism’s emphasis on individual self-responsibility 
and meritocratic achievement.’(Habibis forthcoming). 
MWW now sits at this interface between collective rights 
to self-determination and individualistic neo-liberalism, 
straddling it rather uncomfortably through the mechanism 
of NPM. 
The separation of the contract for repairs and 
maintenance from the broader contract for property 
management services is a clear example of 
fragmentation, a feature of NPM that can, as O’Flynn 
(2007) notes, erode accountability and responsibility. 
This seems to be occurring here. MWW, due to its 
longstanding relationships and accountabilities to the 
communities of the Fitzroy Valley, feels a relational 
accountability to those communities in the housing 
repairs and maintenance area, even when it no longer 
has the resources and contract arrangements that would 
enable it to properly fulfil them. The contractor, based 
over 1,000 kilometres away from these communities, 
does not have the same relational accountabilities to 
them. In addition, processes are often as important 
as outcomes and it is clear the processes MWW uses 
are culturally respectful, in local Indigenous languages 
where necessary, appropriate for local Aboriginal people 
to understand, mostly face to face, and highly flexible 
and responsive.
It is very clear that the relational accountability approach 
which MWW staff, particularly the local staff, feel to 
the communities of the Fitzroy Valley is a strong driver 
for delivery of positive outcomes for the community 
members they serve. MWW’s own legitimacy with those 
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communities depends on them being able to ensure 
the continued provision of safe, secure and affordable 
housing for people whether in town or in the remotest 
outstations. Cultural obligations to ‘look after’ people 
are strong. And MWW’s informal but long-standing 
relationships with Community Councils are essential to 
their ability to do this work successfully. Evidently, MWW 
goes way beyond its contracted service responsibilities 
to make sure that services are delivered because its 
relational accountabilities demand that.
But it is frustrated at present that the multiple objectives 
it feels it could achieve if government relations were 
different are being inhibited. MWW believes that it has 
in the past, and could again in future, employ more 
local staff, support more local Aboriginal business, and 
achieve better results for the Fitzroy Valley communities 
if contracting accountability arrangements were changed 
to a more flexible, holistic and relational approach 
(Dwyer et al. 2014, Tenbensel et al. 2013). A public 
value approach to accountability that stresses pursuing 
multiple objectives (jobs, business development, housing, 
governance autonomy and local empowerment), a 
relational approach to achieving outcomes, where trust 
and legitimacy are central to their achievement, and 
performance is assessed by client satisfaction, would 
provide the flexibility and adaptability that might enable 
MWW to achieve both the WA Housing Authority’s overall 
goals, and the goals of a more sustainable future for the 
people of the Fitzroy Valley.
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Notes
1. The leaders of five tribes started meeting in the late 1970s 
to form a strong voice to government, and MWW was 
institutionalised in 1978.
2. COAG brings together the Australian Government and State 
and Territory jurisdictions as well as a representative of 
local government.
3. Calculated from figures provided by Habibis et al. 2016 in 
Table 11. Under NPRH it probably remains at a similar level, 
though data is not publicly available.
4. See Tables 9 and 10 in Habibis et al. 2016 for details.
5. E.g., in one community very close to a major river, houses 
have been built on new earth mounds 1–2 metres high, 
which are already beginning to erode away due to seasonal 
flooding. Older houses on stilts in the rest of the community 
are far better designed to deal with this regular occurrence. 
Thin metal fencing around houses is poor quality, easily 
damaged and already failing compared to older style 
cyclone fencing that is tough and lasting.
6. In Fitzroy Crossing some public housing is still managed by 
the WA Housing Authority directly through its Derby office, 
over 200 kilometres away.
7. This refers to the Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils and 
Associations Act 1976.
8. However, MWW no longer has the contract for the repairs 
and maintenance aspect of housing management in the 
Fitzroy Valley, since the WA Housing Authority contracted 
a major non-Indigenous company to provide this service 
State-wide.
9. The contract of June 2016
10. Of the rest, some are directly serviced by the WA Housing 
Authority (e.g. Noonkanbah). Some are serviced from Halls 
Creek and others may not be serviced.
11. This is under a ‘Partnership Contract’ with the WA 
Government, under the Government’s Delivery Community 
Services in Partnership Policy.
12. If it were tried, the costs would be borne by the Aboriginal 
people who did not comply with mainstream housing rules 
strictly applied.
13. MWW is a non-profit organisation so it does not declare 
profits; rather surplus which is not reinvested directly into 
the organisation is shared through donations to a range of 
local community organisations and events.
14. P1 is within 8 hours but this level is not used in remote 
areas, so all P1s in remote areas are given a P2 rating.
15. One team I went with to a community very close to Fitzroy 
Crossing found that 10 of 11 jobs logged for one community 
had not been completed within the required timeframe. 
They then had to undertake follow up with the WA Housing 
Authority to try to get them acted upon.
16. For example, when a door lock needed fixing the contractor 
replaced the door, but left the new door unpainted with no 
record that this painting now needed to be done to protect 
the new wooden door against the elements.
17. While willing to pay for long travel times for out of town 
contractors, they would not reimburse him adequately, 
particularly for higher costs of return visits to jobs, and he 
found their systems were too bureaucratic and difficult.
18. Of course Bunuba people remain part of the MWW Board 
and staff, but they no longer have discrete control over their 
own housing management.
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